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Enhancing Criminal Penalties for
Catastrophic Discharges: Closing a
Clean Water Act Loophole that a
Leaking Supertanker Can Sail Through
Robert W. Vinal*
The Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska has greatly in-
creased public awareness of the amount of environmen-
tal damage which can result from a large discharge of
pollutants. This disaster has lead Congress to consider
toughening penalties for a variety of environmental vio-
lations. The author discusses proposed "environmental
catastrophe" legislation which would empower federal
judges to impose criminal sentences of up to thirty years
for certain environmental crimes. Aside from the severity
of the proposed penalties, the most controversial aspect
of the bill is that it focuses on the resulting environmen-
tal damage rather than the polluting act itself.
I. Introduction
The recent indictment returned against the Exxon Corpo-
ration, in connection with the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill in
Alaska,1 has revealed the inadequacy of the present criminal
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
* The author is the Inspector General of New York City's Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection and has served as a Special Assistant United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York. He was formerly Chief of the Kings County
District Attorney's Environmental Crimes Bureau. B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Cortland; M.A.,
S.U.N.Y. at Albany; J.D., St. John's University School of Law. Member, Committee
on Criminal Litigation, Environmental Law Section, New York State Bar Association.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the
views or policies of any agencies or organizations with which the author is, or has
been, associated.
1. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 (D. Alaska Feb. 27, 1990).
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19722 which penalize illegal dischargers. Despite the environ-
mentally catastrophic results of Exxon's release of over ten
million gallons of crude oil, Exxon's allegedly negligent con-
duct 4 constitutes only a misdemeanor offense 5 under the
Clean Water Act's (CWA) criminal penalty provisions. In or-
der to bring felony charges against Exxon, federal prosecutors
were forced to utilize two obscure provisions of federal acts
regulating the fitness and competence of a vessel's crew
members.
The purpose of this article is to: (1) critically analyze the
present criminal provisions of the CWA which deal with ille-
gal discharges; (2) review pending legislation which is
designed to enhance present criminal penalties by creating the
new crime of "endangering life or causing environmental ca-
tastrophe" (Environmental Crimes Act);7 and (3) propose that
the quantity of pollutants discharged be utilized as the stan-
dard aggravating factor in the gradation of CWA criminal
offenses.
II. Analysis of the Discharge Provisions of the CWA
Although Congress has enacted a number of laws to pro-
tect various waterways and their inhabitants,8 the CWA was
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), as amended by Water Quality Act of 1987, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1285, 1311-1387 (1988).
3. The spill covered over 1,000 square miles of Alaska's Prince William Sound
with oil, fouled over 1,000 miles of beaches, and, according to wildlife officials, killed
more than 1,000 sea otters, 140 bald eagles, and 250,000 seabirds. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1,
1990, at D25, col. 3.
4. One count of the indictment charged Exxon with negligently discharging 10
million gallons of crude oil in violation of the Clean Water Act. United States v.
Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 (D. Alaska Feb. 27, 1990).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
6. Exxon was charged with one count of violating the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46
U.S.C. § 3718(b) (1988), and one count of violating the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988).
7. H.R. 3641, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 3641].
8. See, e.g., Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988); Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1445 (1988); Farmington Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988);
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988); Deep Water
Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
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designed to be the statutory centerpiece of the effort "to re-
store and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters."9 Under the CWA, it is illegal
to discharge a pollutant from a point source into the navigable
waters of the United States unless the discharger possesses a
permit which authorizes the discharge.10 To enforce this per-
mitting system, the CWA contains criminal penalties,1 as well
as civil'2 and administrative's penalties.
The elements to be proved in establishing an illegal dis-
charge are broadly defined under the statute. The term "pol-
lutant" has been broadly defined under the CWAI' and inter-
pretive case law,' 5 to encompass virtually every substance
which is not naturally found in the water, or specifically ex-
empted under the statute. Also, most identifiable methods of
discharge which introduce a pollutant into navigable waters
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988); Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-718 (1988);
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445
(1988); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1988); Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1988); Dangerous Cargo Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3718 (1988).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1251; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d
580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342.
11. Id. § 1319(c).
12. Id. § 1319(d). Special civil penalties are available for oil and hazardous sub-
stance spills. See id. § 1321(b)(6).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g).
14. The CWA defines "pollutant" as:
[D]redged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materi-
als, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term does
not mean (A) "sewage from vessels" within the meaning of section 1322 of
this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or
gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well [is] used ... to facilitate
production . . . [in] the State in which the well is located, and if such State
determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation
of ground or surface water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
15. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 852-53 (7th Cir.
1977); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 989, 1006-07
(W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
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constitute a "point source."16 Further, the statutory definition
of "navigable waters"'17 has been interpreted to cover not just
rivers, harbors, and ocean waters within territorial limits, but
also non-navigable streams, ponds, creeks, and even some land
areas which drain into such bodies of water.18
It is clear that a point source discharge constitutes a vio-
lation of the CWA unless the discharge specifically conforms
to the effluent limitations and standards applicable under the
discharger's permit.19 Where a discharger violates a permit
condition, or the discharger has no permit,20 the discharge
constitutes a crime if either the negligent or knowing mens
rea requirement of the criminal penalties section of the CWA
is met.2
16. The CWA defines a "point source" as:
[Any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not lim-
ited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This
term does not include agricultural storm water discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
See, e.g., United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373-74 (10th Cir.
1979); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45 (5th Cir. 1980); Trustees for
Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984); O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill Inc.,
523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at 1337.
17. The CWA defines the term "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
The term "territorial seas" is defined as "the belt of the seas measured from the
line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact
with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and ex-
tending seaward a distance of three miles." Id. § 1362(8).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 1978); Earth Sciences,
Inc., 599 F.2d at 374-75; United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979);
Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1188 n.1 (10th Cir. 1979); Weisman, 489 F. Supp. at
1337-39; United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668-73 (M.D. Fla. 1974); See S.
CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3776; 118 CONG. REC. 33,756-57 (1972).
19. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Tenneco
Polymers, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc.,
617 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Md. 1985).
20. See United States v. Tom-Cat Dev., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Alaska
1985).
21. See United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Oxford Royal
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss1/2
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Since the statutory definition of the term "pollutant"
does not specifically refer to oil or petroleum products, the
question of whether an unpermitted discharge of oil into navi-
gable waters constituted a prosecutable offense under the
CWA was, until recently, open to judicial interpretation. 22
However, Congress recently settled this issue23 by including
language in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)24 which ex-
plicitly provides that illegal discharges of oil and other haz-
ardous substances25 are subject to the CWA's criminal penal-
ties provisions.2
III. Criminal Penalties for Illegal Discharges Under the
CWA: A Lack of Aggravating Provisions
Where an illegal discharge is knowingly made, the dis-
charger is guilty of a three-year felony offense.27 A knowing
discharge is aggravated (i.e. upgraded) to become a more seri-
ous fifteen-year offense2 s only if the discharger knows at the
time of the discharge that the discharge "places another per-
Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Frezzo
Bros., 546 F. Supp. 713, 720 (E.D. Pa. 1982), afl'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983).
22. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 109-12 (6th Cir. 1977).
23. See S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 745.
24. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484-575 (1990).
25. As defined in section 1321(b)(3) of the CWA.
26. The OPA amended section 1319(c) of the CWA to include section 1321(b)(3)
violations. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 537. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 154, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 833.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). A knowing discharge is punishable:
by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If a conviction of a
person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person ...
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $100,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment of not more than 6 years, or by both.
Id.
28. Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A). This aggravated offense is punishable by:
a fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years,
or both. A person which is an organization shall, upon conviction of violating
this subparagraph, be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000. If a con-
viction of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such
person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled
with respect to both fine and imprisonment.
5
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son in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
... "2 Thus, even if an unscrupulous discharger intention-
ally dumps millions of gallons of toxic pollutants into pristine,
geographically isolated waters, thereby causing severe and
perhaps irreparable environmental damage, the discharger
would only face prosecution for the less serious three-year fel-
ony charge unless the government could prove that the dis-
charger's action placed at least one human being in imminent
danger s0 of serious bodily injury."
Where a discharge is made negligently, but not know-
29. Id. The felony crime of "knowing endangerment" was added to the CWA's
criminal penalties provisions by the Water Quality Act of 1987, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-
1285, 1311-1387. To date, two "knowing endangerment" convictions have been ob-
tained. In United States v. Borjohn Optical Technology, Inc., Cr. 89-0256 (D. Mass.
May 23, 1990), reported in 5 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 28 (July 1990), defend-
ants were convicted of "knowing endangerment" as a result of having exposed their
employees to toxic levels of nickel, nitric acid, and nitrogen dioxide during the course
of illegally discharging these substances into a public sewer system; see also 21 Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1363 (Nov. 16, 1990). In United States v. Plaza Health Labo-
ratories, Inc., No. Cr. 89-0338 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 1989), a medical laboratory and its
vice president were convicted of "knowing endangerment" for having discharged into
New York Bay and the Hudson River vials of human blood which were infected with
a highly contagious hepatitis virus. N.Y.L.J. Feb. 1, 1991, at 1, col. 2; see also 4 NAT'L
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 20 (July 1989).
At least one other indictment charging "knowing endangerment" has been
brought. See United States v. Finishing Corp. of America, No. Cr. 89-0158 (N.D. Ohio
May 31, 1989), reported in 4 NAT'L ENvTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 20 (July 1989).
30. The issue of what degree of human exposure is sufficient to satisfy the immi-
nent danger element of the CWA crime of "knowing endangerment" has yet to be
raised at the appellate level. However, this issue was considered by the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Protex Indus. Inc., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989) in the context of
an appeal from a conviction for "knowing endangerment" under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988), which contains the same "im-
minent danger" language as the CWA. In Protex Industries, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed a district court decision and held that the crime of "knowing endangerment"
is not unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court also held that the "imminent dan-
ger" and "serious bodily injury" standards had been met at trial by the government's
introduction of evidence that company employees had suffered psycho-organic syn-
drome as a result of exposure to hazardous wastes that the company was illegally
storing, transporting, and disposing. See also Harris, Cavanaugh & Zisk, Criminal
Liability for Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Cor-
porations and Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1988).
31. "[Tlhe term 'serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which involves a sub-
stantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(iv).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss1/2
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ingly, the discharge constitutes only a misdemeanor offense
and at present the CWA contains no aggravating provisions
which could upgrade a first time offense to a felony-level
crime.3 2 Thus, in United States v. Exxon Corp.,13 since the
federal prosecutors determined that they could only prove a
negligent discharge by Exxon, instead of a knowing discharge,
the misdemeanor offense was the only available charge under
the CWA to present to the grand jury. 4
IV. "Causing Environmental Catastrophe" as a Criminal
Penalty Aggravator
In enacting the OPA,36 Congress passed up the opportu-
nity to increase CWA criminal penalties for illegal discharges.
However, legislation has been introduced in Congress 6 that
creates three new crimes3 7 which are intended to increase the
criminal penalties that could be imposed on a defendant
charged with one or more presently existing environmental
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). A negligent discharge is punishable by:
a fine of not less than $2,500 nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or
by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by both. If a conviction of a
person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person...
punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.
Id.
33. No. A90-015 (D. Alaska Feb. 27, 1990).
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
35. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484-575 (1990).
36. H.R. 3641. This legislation would create a new chapter entitled, "Chapter 34 -
Environmental Crimes" within Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Presently, all existing envi-
ronmental crimes are only contained within the criminal penalties sections of various
environmental statutes and have not been consolidated within one statute. See, e.g.,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act § 11005, 42 U.S.C. § 6992d(b) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1423(b),
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b).
37. The three new crimes created by this legislation are knowingly or recklessly
endangering life or causing environmental crimes, endangering life or causing envi-
ronmental catastrophe by a course of illegal conduct, and negligently endangering life
or causing environmental catastrophe. H.R. 3641, §§ 731-733. These crimes are also
contained within the criminal penalties provisions of other environmental statutes.
See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); Solid
Waste Disposal Act § 11005, 42 U.S.C. § 6992d(b); Safe Drinking Water Act §
1423(b), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b).
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crimes.3 8 If this proposed Environmental Crimes Act is en-
acted into law, illegal discharges under the CWA s9 would be
more severely penalized if the government could prove that a
defendant, in committing the discharge, knowingly or reck-
lessly, 0 negligently, 41 or by a course of illegal conduct,"2 en-
dangered human life, caused serious injury to another, or
caused environmental catastrophe.
With the exception of criminal negligence (which will be
discussed infra), each of the other two new crimes is punisha-
ble by substantial prison terms and "mega" fines. These pen-
alties vary according to both the type of risk caused by the
defendant and whether the defendant has previously been
convicted of a violation under the section. 3
The proposed legislation also contains a provision requir-
ing mandatory, court-ordered environmental audits where an
organization has been convicted of any of the new felony
offenses."
38. H.R. 3641, § 735(1) defines "environmental offense" as a criminal violation of
any one of 23 environmental statutes.
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). This section provides criminal penalties for negligent
violations, knowing violations, knowing endangerment, false statements, and treat-
ment of single operational upset. Id.
40. H.R. 3641, § 731(a). A person who knowingly or recklessly endangers life or
causes environmental catastrophe is one who commits an environmental offense and
thereby knowingly or recklessly causes a risk of (1) imminent death of a human be-
ing, (2) serious bodily injury to a human being, or (3) environmental catastrophe, and
shall be punished as set forth in subsection (b) of section 731. Id.
41. Id. § 733. A person who negligently endangers life or causes environmental
catastrophe is one who commits an environmental offense and thereby negligently
causes a risk of (1) imminent death of a human being, (2) serious bodily injury to a
human being, or (3) environmental catastrophe, and shall be imprisoned not more
than one year or fined not more than $125,000 in the case of an individual or $500,000
in the case of an organization, or both. Id.
42. Id. § 732. A person who endangers life or causes environmental catastrophe
by a course of illegal conduct is one who knowingly engages in a course of illegal
conduct and thereby causes a risk of (1) imminent death of a human being, (2) seri-
ous bodily injury to a human being, or (3) environmental catastrophe, and shall be
punished as set forth in subsection (c) of section 732. Id.
43. Id. §§ 731(b)(1)(B), 732(c)(1)(B). The most severe penalty available under
the proposed legislation is a maximum of 30 years imprisonment, a fine of up to
$500,000 in the case of an individual and $2,000,000 in the case of an organization, or
both. Id. § 732(c)(1)(B).
44. See id. § 734.
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This article will focus on the bill's use of the concept of
"environmental catastrophe" as a penalty enhancer. The bill
defines "environmental catastrophe" to mean:
(A) death or injury to a member of a threatened or
endangered species of fish, wildlife, plant, or other natural
resources;
(B) death or injury to 20 percent or more of the
known population of any species of fish, wildlife, or plant
within a defined ecosystem;
(C) death or injury to 5 percent of the known popula-
tion of any species of fish, wildlife, or plant within the
United States or the waters of the United States; or
(D) destruction or alteration of habitat, or release of
any amount in an amount or a location that causes-
(i) serious disruption of any ecosystem or food chain;
(ii) environmental contamination of any species of
fish, wildlife, or plant that cannot be remedied, cannot be
remedied without causing significant environmental dam-
age, or cannot be remedied within one generation;
(iii) serious genetic or toxicological effects on any
species of fish, wildlife, or plant;
(iv) serious disruption or alteration of local, regional,
or global climate; or
(v) significant waste or misuse of public natural re-
sources . . .45
As the length and breadth of the preceding excerpt indi-
cates, any attempt to develop an all-encompassing definition
of an "environmental catastrophe" is a most difficult, and per-
haps impossible, undertaking. In trying to ensure that all pos-
sible catastrophes are covered, such a result-oriented standard
will inevitably encompass conduct which would otherwise
merit a lesser criminal penalty. For example, one need not be
an anti-environmentalist to question whether a discharge of a
minimal amount of a pollutant which causes a nonlife-threat-
ening "injury to a member of a threatened or endangered spe-
cies of fish, wildlife, plant, or other natural resources," '46 really
45. Id. § 735(5).
46. Id. § 735(5)(A).
1990]
9
32 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
constitutes an environmental catastrophe.
Thus, although the bill's goal of establishing aggravating
factors is laudable, the legislation's utilization of a broadly de-
fined catastrophe standard to upgrade present penalties may
lead to an unfair application. For example, a first-time of-
fender could be prosecuted for a "ten year" felony crime for a
single, minor, reckless discharge4 7 which does not actually
cause substantial damage to the environment.
From a prosecutorial viewpoint, proving that a discharge
constitutes an environmental catastrophe, as defined by the
bill, may be more difficult than it initially appears. Such proof
could require the analytical and testimonial services of an
ecology expert whose results would, no doubt, be contradicted
by the defendant's ecology expert, thereby leading to an ex-
pensive and often inconclusive "battle of the experts."
Also, in its attempt to upgrade the penalties for all pres-
ently existing environmental crimes, the proposed legislation
may fail to accomplish its goal with regard to certain offenses.
For example, as previously discussed,4 ' a conviction for a neg-
ligent, unpermitted discharge of pollutants under the CWA
carries a potential prison sentence of up to one year and a
potential fine of up to $25,000 per day of violation.49 Under
the proposed legislation, even if the government can prove
that a negligent discharge under the CWA caused a risk of
death, serious bodily injury, or environmental catastrophe, an
individual can still only be sentenced up to one year of im-
prisonment and fined not more than a total of $125,000.5"
Thus, if the government can prove that an individual illegally
discharged for six days, the potential fine will be higher under
the CWA than under the proposed crime of negligently en-
dangering life or causing environmental catastrophe.
47. Id. § 731(b)(2)(A).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B).
50. H.R. 3641, § 733.
[Vol. 8
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V. Utilizing the Amount of Pollutant Discharged as a
Criminal Penalty Aggravator
Under the present criminal provisions of the CWA, the
quantity of pollutants discharged by the offender is irrele-
vant." Consequently, a person discharging one gallon of a pol-
lutant can be charged with the same criminal penalty as a
person discharging millions of gallons. However, the utiliza-
tion of a quantity-based standard for penalty enhancement
has been used in nonenvironmental, federal-criminal statutes
such as those statutes penalizing the manufacture and distri-
bution of controlled substances. 2
Furthermore, quantity-based aggravating standards have
been included in some state environmental criminal laws.
Under the statutory framework established by the State of
New York to criminally penalize the illegal release" of haz-
ardous substances 5 to the environment,55 the amount of the
hazardous substance released is utilized to determine the
criminal penalty to be assessed.58 Thus, a knowing or reckless
release of any amount of a hazardous substance constitutes a
class A misdemeanor,57 but a knowing release to the state's
51. See Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 627 (8th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 374 (10th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Ashland Oil, 364 F. Supp. 349, 351 (E.D. Ky. 1973);
52. For example, a person who manufactures, distributes, or dispenses 100 grams
of heroin (or 500 grams of cocaine) faces a prison term of between 5 to 40 years,
whereas the same person faces a term of 10 years to life if he manufactures, distrib-
utes, or dispenses one kilogram of heroin (or five kilograms of cocaine). 21 U.S.C. §
841(b) (1988).
53. A "release" is defined as "any pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, or
leaching, directly or indirectly, of a substance so that the substance or any related
constituent thereof, or any degradation product of such a substance or of a related
constituent thereof, may enter the environment, or the disposal of any substance."
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702(13) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
E.C.L.].
54. Hazardous substances are defined by E.C.L. § 71-2702(10) and listed in N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 597 (1988).
55. New York's criminal release statute regarding hazardous substances is multi-
media in nature and encompasses all releases regardless of whether the substance
enters the air, water, or land. E.C.L. § 71-2702(12).
56. Id. §§ 71-2710 to -2714.
57. Id. § 71-2711(3).
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waters" of more than one hundred gallons or one thousand
pounds of a hazardous substance, whichever is less, consti-
tutes a class D felony.59 Similarly, reckless conduct which
causes the release of more than two hundred gallons or two
thousand pounds, whichever is less, of a hazardous substance
constitutes a class E felony.60
Emphasizing the quantity of a discharge as the standard,
but not necessarily exclusive,"' aggravating factor for enhanc-
ing CWA criminal penalties is sensible from a fairness stand-
point. Obviously, the larger the amount of a pollutant dis-
charged, the greater the chance for catastrophic
environmental impact. But to focus only on the resulting en-
vironmental impact, as the proposed Environmental Crimes
Act does, ignores the discharge and examines only the injury
it causes. Thus, if two independent point sources, A and B,
each recklessly discharge the same quantity of a pollutant, but
A's discharge is contained and cleaned up by the Coast Guard
before it can cause the "environmental catastrophe" that B's
discharge causes, only B will face the enhanced criminal pen-
alties under the proposed act.
Clearly, a quantity-based penalty aggravator constitutes a
more definitive enhancement measure than a "catastrophe"
standard. Also, proving the quantity of the pollutants released
in a specific discharge would not, generally, require the ser-
vices of an expert since the amount discharged can often be
established through purchase, storage, and transport records,
or through a physical examination of the point source.6 "
58. Such waters include lakes, rivers, bays, sounds, ponds, wells, streams, canals,
marshes, reservoirs, the Atlantic Ocean within the territorial limits of the State of
New York, and all other bodies of surface or underground water. Id. §§ 71-2702(7),
17-0105(2).
59. Id. § 71-2713(5).
60. Id. § 71-2712(2).
61. New York State's criminal statutes allow consideration of other factors when
penalizing illegal releases of hazardous substances. These penalty-aggravating factors
include a determination of whether a substantial risk of physical injury was created
and whether physical injury to a person actually occurred. See, e.g., E.C.L. §§ 71-2712
to -2714; See also E.C.L. § 71-1933.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1318; Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3007, 42 U.S.C. § 6927.
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VI. Conclusion
The basic rationale for including criminal penalties as
part of the available enforcement weapons in environmental
statutes is to compel compliance with the law by those who
might otherwise be tempted to commit violations if they only
faced a cost-of-doing-business administrative civil fine.6 3 As
the Exxon oil spill in Alaska and other recent major spills6 4
have clearly demonstrated, large chemical and petroleum stor-
age facilities and supertanker-type vessels possess the most
potent capacity to inflict severe damage to our waters through
massive discharges. However, it is the companies that operate
such facilities and vessels, and that produce, store, and trans-
port vast quantities of potential pollutants, that are most sus-
ceptible to "writing off" the expense of administrative, civil,
and even criminal fines. Such "write-offs" will be exacerbated
if the costs of regulatory compliance are far more expensive
than potential statutory fines." To insure that such compa-
nies and their executives comply with the law, the deterrent
effect of a criminal conviction must be augmented by the
threat of large criminal fines and substantial periods of incar-
ceration. The need for increased criminal fines under the
CWA may be somewhat obviated if present alternative sen-
tencing provisions66 are held to be available.61 However, to re-
63. See Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 337, 346 (June 9, 1989).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil, No. Cr. 88-146 (D.W. Pa. 1989), re-
ported in 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2473 (Mar. 17, 1989) (the defendant
pleaded nolo contendere to a CWA negligent discharge and other charges regarding
the release of 750,000 gallons of diesel fuel when a storage tank collapsed. The fuel
contaminated three rivers, forcing authorities to cut off drinking water supplies to
one million people.); United States v. Ballard Shipping Co., No. Cr. 89-051 (D.R.I.
1989), reported in 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 831 (Sept. 15, 1989) (CWA convic-
tions of both the company and the ship master for the negligent discharge of 290,000
gallons of heating oil into the Narragansett Bay).
65. See generally Criminal Prosecutions in Environmental Law: A Study of the
"Kepone" Case, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 291 (1987).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1982) provides that if the offense the defendant is con-
victed of resulted in pecuniary loss to a person, e.g., the cost of containment or
cleanup incurred by the government, the defendant can be fined double the amount
of such loss.
67. The alternative sentencing provision authorized by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(d) was
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ally insure that executives, facility managers, and tanker cap-
tains personally oversee that pollutants under their control do
not accidentally or otherwise spill into our waters, the threat
of certain, 8 and potentially substantial, incarceration must be
present even for negligent discharges of large quantities of
pollutants.
To provide the strongest possible deterrent, the CWA
should contain "mega discharge" criminal provisions for both
knowing and negligent discharges. Negligent, unpermitted
pollutant discharges of more than 100,000 gallons"9 should be
punishable by up to a three year prison term. Negligent dis-
charges of over one million gallons should be punishable by
both imprisonment and fines within the ranges enumerated by
the proposed Environmental Crimes Act.70
Such enhanced and graduated criminal penalty provisions
will establish a balanced, comprehensive array of legal weap-
ons for criminal enforcement of the CWA's illegal discharge
provisions.
utilized by the sentencing judge in United States v. Ashland Oil, No. Cr. 88-146
(D.W. Pa. 1989), reported in 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 2473 (Mar. 17, 1989).
Ashland was fined $2.25 million after pleading nolo contendere to misdemeanor
counts initiated under the CWA and the Refuse Act. Id. The Justice Department has
announced that it intends to utilize these alternative fine provisions in the Exxon
prosecution. N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1990, at D25, col. 2.
68. Mandatory incarceration for certain convicted defendants who have commit-
ted specified offenses is one of the goals of the federal sentencing guidelines prepared
by the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
A judge who is sentencing a convicted defendant must select a sentence from within a
guideline range which is based on the offense level and the defendant's criminal his-
tory. The Clean Water Act offenses are covered under UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ 2Q1.l-2Q1.3 (Nov. 1989).
These guidelines were recently used by a judge in imposing incarceration for a
conviction of a knowing discharge under the CWA. United States v. Mills, No. Cr. 88-
03100-WEA (D.N. Fla. 1989), reported in 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2633 (Apr.
21, 1989).
69. The discharge of 100,000 gallons or more of oil in a coastal waterway is con-
sidered by the United States Coast Guard to be a major spill. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1990, at B1, col. 4.
70. H.R. 3641, § 733.
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